(1)

90 - 69

No. _____

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 25 1990
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1989

POWERLINE SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.,
NELDA S. ELLIOTT AND BILL ELLIOTT

Petitioners,

versus

T. L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

David F. Butterfield
Counsel of Record
Mayer, Smith & Roberts
1550 Creswell
Shreveport, LA 71101
(318) 222-2135

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

1. Can a corporation establish a wholly owned subsidiary to operate a hazardous waste facility in order to profit from the operation of the facility while at the same time insulating itself from potential environmental liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq.?

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceeding below were:

Joslyn Manufacturing Co.
T. L. James & Company, Inc.
Powerline Supply Co., Inc.
Nelda S. Elliott and Bill Elliott
Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co.
Lance D. Alworth
F. B. James
G. W. James

STATEMENT UNDER RULE 29.1

Elliott Electric Supply Company, Inc., merged with its wholly owned subsidiary, Powerline Supply Company, Inc., on or about November 19, 1986, and Elliott Electric Supply Company, Inc., was the surviving corporate entity. Elliott Electric Supply Company, Inc., subsequently dissolved Powerline Supply Company, Inc., on August 13, 1987.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented i

List of Parties ii

Statement under Rule 29.1 ii

Table of Contents iii

Table of Authorities iv

Opinions Below 2

Jurisdiction 2

Statutes Involved 3

Statement of the Case 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ

I. The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit Has Rendered A Decision In Conflict With Decisions Of Other Federal Courts Of Appeals On The Same Matter 6

II. The Ultimate Resolution Of The Issue Raised In This Case Will Have Far-Reaching Implications For Corporate America And For The Public In General 8

III. The Issue In This Case Must Be Resolved Uniformly To Insure The Proper Functioning Of Financial Markets And To Provide Guidance for Economic Expansion 9

Conclusion 11

Appendix ..... App. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Colorado vs. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Envtl.L.Rep. (Envtl.L.Inst.) 20578 (D. Col. 1987) 7, 10

Idaho vs. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) 7, 9

Joslyn Corporation vs. T. L. James & Company, Inc., 696 F.Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988) 4

Joslyn Manufacturing Company vs. T. L. James & Company, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) 4

New York vs. Shore Realty Corporation, 759 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1985) 6, 7, 9

United States vs. Carolawn Company, 21 E.R.C. 2124 (D.S.C. 1984) 9

United States vs. Chem-dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 9

United States vs. Conservation Chemical Co. 628 F.Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985) 9

United States vs. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F.Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989) 10

United States vs. McGraw Edison Company, et al Cv. 88-542C (W.D. NY 1989) 10

United States vs. Mirabal, 23 E.R.C. 1511 (E.D. Pa. 1985) 10

United States vs. Mottolo, 629 F.Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984), 605 F.Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985), 695 F.Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) 7, 9

United States vs. Nicolet, Inc., No. 85-3060 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

United States vs. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company, Inc., 579 F.Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) 6, 7, 9

United States vs. Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp. 546 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) 8

Vermont vs. Staco, Inc., 684 F.Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988) 7, 10

STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) 2

42 U.S.C. 9601 4

42 U.S.C. 9601(20) 3

42 U.S.C. 9607(a) 3, 4

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) 6

42 U.S.C. 9613(b) 2

LA-R.S. 30:2001 4

LA-R.S. 30:2276(A)(5) 4

FEDERAL RULES:

Rule 54(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2

No. _____

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1989

POWERLINE SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.,
NELDA S. ELLIOTT AND BILL ELLIOTT

Petitioners,

versus

T. L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioners, Powerline Supply Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Powerline"), Nelda S. Elliott and Bill Elliott, respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the Judgment and Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in the above entitled proceeding on January 29, 1990.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reported at 893 F.2d 80, and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, App. 1, *infra*.

The Fifth Circuit's denial of Petitioners' application for rehearing is unreported, but reprinted in the Appendix hereto, App. 11, *infra*.

The opinion of the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana is reported at 696 F.Supp. 222, and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, App. 13, *infra*.

JURISDICTION

Invoking federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. Section 9613(b), Joslyn Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Joslyn") brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division. On September 19, 1988, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent T. L. James & Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "James Company"). On November 16, 1988, the district court granted Joslyn's motion for entry of judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(b).

On Joslyn's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an opinion affirming the district court's ruling on January 29, 1990. The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioners' timely application for rehearing on March 26, 1990. The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the Fifth Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The following statutory provisions involved have been printed in the Appendix: 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a), 42 U.S.C. Section 9601(20).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1985, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Inactive and Abandoned Sites Division, issued a compliance order to Joslyn, Powerline, James Company, Lance D. Alworth, Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company, and to multiple other potentially responsible parties requiring environmental remediation at a former wood creosoting facility located in Bossier City, Louisiana. The facility is commonly referred to as the "Lincoln Creosote site." Lincoln Creosote Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Lincoln"), a wholly owned subsidiary of James Company, operated the creosote facility from 1935 to 1950. Lincoln subsequently sold the facility to Joslyn. Joslyn operated the facility from 1950 through 1969. Thereafter, the facility was dismantled by Koppers Company, Inc., and abandoned. After abandonment, the site was subdivided and sold to numerous individuals and legal entities, including Powerline and Lance D. Alworth. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company owned land adjacent to the site and provided rail transport services to and from the facility during its operation.

Joslyn filed suit against James Company, Powerline, Koppers Company, Inc., Lance D. Alworth and the Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq., and under the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act ("LEQA"), LA-R.S. 30:2001, et seq. The suit sought contribution for environmental remediation at the site.

James Company filed motions to dismiss all claims against it for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted and for summary judgment. All parties with claims against James Company argued that James Company was "directly" liable for Lincoln's environmental torts as an owner or operator of the facility pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a) and LA-R.S. 30:2276(A)(5). James Company argued that it was to be afforded the traditional protection of shareholder immunity for the environmental torts of its subsidiary and that the record would not support piercing Lincoln's corporate veil to impose environmental liability on James Company. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of James Company. *Joslyn Corporation vs. T. L. James & Company, Inc.*, 696 F.Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).

Upon Joslyn's motion, the district court entered final judgment in favor of James Company pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(b). Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the decision of the district court was affirmed. *Joslyn Manufacturing Company vs. T. L. James & Company*, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).

Whether by outright ownership or by endorsement, James Company owned all of the common and preferred

stock in Lincoln and provided all of the capital necessary for Lincoln's operation. Specifically, James Company guaranteed Lincoln's purchases of creosote oil and lent Lincoln approximately $500,000 in order to purchase a reliable source of timber.

At all times, James Company controlled a majority of Lincoln's directors. James Company and Lincoln had interlocking directors and officers. James Company's executive officers were advised and informed as to Lincoln's operation on a frequent, if not daily, basis and reserved the right to confirm and ratify Lincoln's top level management decisions. In order to protect its investment in Lincoln, James Company hired and fired on-site managers.

James Company consistently received dividends on Lincoln's preferred stock and profited from its loans to Lincoln. James Company purchased creosote products from Lincoln, and Lincoln purchased materials from James Company. Lincoln made charitable contributions at the request and direction of Lincoln's board members controlled by James Company.

Lincoln's corporate headquarters were located in the James Building in Ruston, Louisiana. Lincoln never paid any rent for the use of James Company's facilities. In the interest of convenience, Lincoln often held its corporate meetings immediately following the corporate meetings of the James Company.

Lincoln's creosote operation spilled creosote residue at various places around the site. The site also developed

a creosote drainage problem that was never corrected, despite the recommendations of on-site managers.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit Has Rendered A Decision In Conflict With Decisions Of Other Federal Courts Of Appeals On The Same Matter.

In the case of *New York vs. Shore Realty Corporation*, 759 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1985), (hereinafter cited as *Shore Realty*), the court noted that CERCLA's definition of the phrase "owner or operator" excluded a "person who, without participation in the management of a . . . facility, (held) indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the facility." The court concluded the use of this exception implied that an owning stockholder who managed the corporation was liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator. The court held a corporate shareholder who managed the facility directly liable for his corporation's environmental tort without resorting to a corporate veil piercing analysis.

In the case of *United States vs. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.*, (hereinafter cited as NEPPACCO), 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), the court held an individual named John W. Lee liable for environmental remediation as person who had arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section

9607(a)(3). The court expressly noted that Mr. Lee's liability was distinct from the derivative liability that results from piercing the corporate veil.

In direct contrast to *Shore Realty*, and *NEPPACCO*, the court below in the instant case stated:

> Joslyn urges this Court to read CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator" liberally and broadly to reach parent corporations whose subsidiaries are found liable under the statute. In doing so, Joslyn urges us to follow the several Courts, including the Second Circuit, which have extended CERCLA liability to parents. See *New York vs. Shore Realty Corporation*, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); *United States vs. Mottolo*, 695 F.Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988); *Colorado vs. Idarado Mining Co.*, 18 Envtl.L.Rep. (Envtl.L.Inst.) 20578 (D. Col. 1987); *Vermont vs. Staco, Inc.*, 684 F.Supp. 822 (D.Vt. 1988); *Idaho vs. Bunker Hill Co.*, 635 F.Supp. 665 (D.Idaho 1986). We decline to do so.
>
> 893 F.2d at 82

The Fifth's Circuit's opinion expressly rejected existing precedent in other federal appellate courts. The importance of the issue raised by the conflicting opinions requires that this Court grant this writ application to settle the issue. Otherwise owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Fifth Circuit will have significantly greater protections over owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities in other parts of the country.

II.

The Ultimate Resolution Of The Issue Raised In This Case Will Have Far-Reaching Implications For Corporate America And For The Public In General

If the decision of the court below is correct, corporate America, particularly those corporations involved in hazardous waste activities, should form subsidiaries to conduct operations with potential environmental consequences. Under such arrangements, the parent corporation would be able to profit from the hazardous waste activity while incurring none of the potential liabilities. So long as the parent corporation's conduct with respect to the subsidiary is not so outrageous as to justify piercing the subsidiary's corporate veil under traditional notions of corporate law, the parent corporation can completely avoid CERCLA liability.

On the other hand, the incorporation of subsidiary corporations to operate hazardous waste facilities could have a devastating impact upon the public. Even a small hazardous waste facility might generate an environmental disaster. The operating subsidiary corporation might not have the financial ability or insurance to bring about environmental remediation. The cost of the clean up would then be forced upon the taxpayers, a result never intended by Congress in enacting CERCLA. As the court pointed out in the case of *United States vs. Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp.*, 546 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), CERLCA was designed to insure that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.

III.

The Issue Raised In This Case Must Be Resolved Uniformly To Insure The Proper Functioning Of Financial Markets And To Provide Guidance For Economic Expansion

Enormous amounts of corporate stock are bought and sold based upon the belief that the investor does not stand personally liable for the corporation's debt. But is this belief justified in the context of environmental liability? Congress expected the Courts to develop a Federal common law to supplement the statutory provisions of CERCLA. *United States vs. Chem-dyne Corp.*, 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). However, the decision of the Court below flies in the face of a developing body of Federal common law holding corporate shareholders directly liable for corporate environmental torts under certain circumstances.[1]

---

[1] In all of the cases below, shareholders who were directly involved in a corporate hazardous waste activity or who were actively involved in the management of the facility were found directly liable, expressly or by implication, for the corporation's environmental tort: *United States vs. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company, Inc.*, 579 F.Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); *Idaho vs. Bunker Hill Co.*, 635 F.Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986); *United States vs. Mottolo*, 629 F.Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984), 605 F.Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985), 695 F.Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988); *United States vs. Conservation Chemical Co.*, 628 F.Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985); *New York vs. Shore Realty Corp.*, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); *United States vs. Carolawn Company*, 21 E.R.C.

(Continued on following page)

Because of the decision of the Court below, financial markets still lack the high degree of certainty necessary for proper functioning. When compared to the decisions of other Federal Courts on the same issue, the decision in this case makes it impossible to predict whether a shareholder can rely on traditional principles of corporate law or whether a shareholder may be directly liable for the corporation's environmental torts. When investors cannot precisely calculate the amount of their potential liability, they are less willing to invest the capital necessary for economic expansion.

Given the widespread institutional and individual ownership of corporate stock, and given the percentage of the gross national product directly or indirectly related to the production, disposal and consumption of hazardous waste products, the issue raised by this case requires resolution by this Honorable Court. Environmental remediation is such an expensive proposition that economic planning for all segments of the national economy is frustrated in the absence of a clear understanding as to potential liability under CERCLA's statutory provisions. Those called upon to resolve key issues in CERLCA's liability scheme cannot be guided by the current uncertainty and conflict existing in the federal jurisprudence.

(Continued from previous page)

2124 (D.S.C. 1984); *United States vs. Mirabal*, 23 E.R.C. 1511 (E.D. Pa. 1985); *Colorado vs. Idarado Mining Co.*, 18 E.L.R. 20578 (D. Co. 1987); *Vermont vs. Staco, Inc.*, 684 F.Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988); *United States vs. Kayser-Roth Corp.*, 724 F.Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989); *United States vs. McGraw Edison Company, et al*, Cv 88-542C (W.D. NY 1989); *United States vs. Nicolet, Inc.*, No. 85-3060 (E.D. Pa. 1989).

Because of the economic, political and social sensitivity of environmental remediation, CERLCA's liability scheme requires uniform resolution, and the necessary uniformity can only be supplied by this Court.

CONCLUSION

The conflicting messages being sent by the federal courts concerning shareholder liability for corporate environmental torts require that this Court grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

MAYER, SMITH & ROBERTS
Attorneys for Powerline Supply Company, Inc., Nelda S. Elliott and Bill Elliott

By /s/ David F. Butterfield
DAVID F. BUTTERFIELD
1550 Creswell
Shreveport, LA 71101
(318) 222-2135

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Page

Opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.....App. 1

Denial of Petitioners' Application For Rehearing...App. 6

Opinion of the United States District for the Western District of Louisiana.....App. 7

42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a).....App. 19

42 U.S.C. Section 9601(20) .....App. 20

JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

T.L. JAMES & CO., INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,

v.

POWERLINE SUPPLY CO., INC.,
Defendant Third Party
Plaintiff-Appellant.

and

Nelda S. ELLIOT, Bill Elliot, and Lance D. Alworth, Louisiana and Arkansas Railroad Co., Defendants-Appellants,

v.

Floyd Benjamin JAMES and George William James, Sr., Third Party Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-4901.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 29, 1990.

Corporation ordered to clean up contaminated site of former wood treating and/or creosoting operation initiated action under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and Louisiana Environmental Quality Act. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division, Tom Stagg, Chief Judge, 696 F.Supp. 222, entered summary judgment for defendants, and corporation appealed. The Court of Appeals, Gee, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) the Acts did not impose direct liability on parent corporations for violations of their wholly owned

subsidiaries, and (2) the corporate veil could not be pierced to impose liability on the parent corporation.

Affirmed.

Robert E. Holden, Mary S. Johnson, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Butterfield, Mayer, Smith & Roberts, Shreveport, La., for Elliot & Powerline Supply.

Kevin M. Ward, Cogswell & Wehrle, Denver, Colo., James L. Adams, Brook, Morial, Cassibry, Fraiche & Pizza, Shreveport, La., for Lance D. Alworth.

Bobby S. Gilliam, Jerald N. Jones, Wilkinson, Carmody & Gilliam, Shreveport, La., for Louisiana and Arkansas Railroad Co.

William F. Ridlon, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, La., for amicus curiae, State of La.

Donald A. Carr, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Michael P. Healy, Anne S. Almy, Appellate Section, Land & Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae U.S.

Donald B. Mitchell, Jr., Stephen J. Weiss, James P. Mercurio, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C., and Robert G. Dawkins, Dawkins, Coyle & Carter, Ruston, La., for defendant-appellee, T.L. James & Co., Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before GEE and JONES, Circuit Judges and HUNTER, District Judge:*

GEE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant contends that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act ("LEQA") impose direct liability on parent corporations for violations of their wholly-owned subsidiaries. Appellant further contends that, absent such liability, the corporate veil should be pierced to impose liability in the instant case. We disagree with both contentions.

Facts

This case arises from the environmental cleanup of a former creosoting plant constructed by the Lincoln Creosoting Company, Inc. ("Lincoln") in Bossier City, Louisiana. Under Lincoln's creosoting recovery system, raw creosoting chemicals dripped from the treating cylinders to a sump pit located underneath the system. Lincoln recovered some creosoting chemicals from the sump. The remaining chemicals were discharged into an open ditch and flowed to the eastern portion of the site, where the chemicals collected in a slough. From the slough, the creosoting chemicals were washed away by rain to the surrounding land areas and waterways.

Lincoln was incorporated in 1935 when C.A. Tooke and J.R. Hayes proposed a business arrangement with

---

* District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

T.L. James whereby T.L. James Co., ("James Co.") would put up the initial capital in return for stock in the company. Under the arrangement, Tooke and Hayes would purchase 40% of the 200 shares of common voting stock and James Co. would own 60% of the common stock and all 200 shares of the non-voting preferred stock of Lincoln. Tooke and Hayes endorsed their shares over as security for their unpaid capital subscription.

At the initial Board of Directors meeting, Tooke was elected Vice President and designated "General Manager with full power and discretion to conduct the affairs" of Lincoln. T.L. James was elected President; his son G.W. James later succeeded him. Lincoln originally established a seven member Board of Directors. Five of these directors were associated with James Co., Tooke and Hayes held the other two seats. Lincoln maintained separate financial books and a separate corporate banking account. Only Hayes and Tooke had check-signing authority. Lincoln regularly held shareholders and directors meetings.

Dissatisfied with Lincoln's performance in the mid-1940's, G.W. James bought out Hayes. G.W. James, then president of Lincoln, hired Lacy, a former James Co. employee, to replace Hayes. In 1945 Lincoln reduced its Board of Directors to five. The new Board consisted of three Lincoln employees who had no ties to James Co. and two persons associated with James Co. In 1947, the Board was expanded to eight members and consisted of four Lincoln employees and four persons associated with James Co.

Lincoln owned its own property and equipment, and maintained its own employees, payrolls, insurance, pension system, and workman's compensation program. Lincoln filed its own tax returns.

In 1950 Tooke died and Lincoln was sold to Joslyn Manufacturing Co. ("Joslyn"). Joslyn owned and operated the plant until Koppers Company, Inc. ("Koppers") purchased it in 1969. Koppers owned the plant until 1971. The property then passed through five separate owners, the last of which subdivided the property. Appellant Powerline Supply Company ("Powerline") purchased one of the subdivided lots in 1982. Appellant Alworth purchased one such lot in 1983. Appellant Louisiana and Arkansas Railway Company ("Railway") owned property adjoining the plant site from 1923 through 1972.

Joslyn filed this action in the district court invoking that court's exclusive jurisdiction under Section 113(b) of the CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. Section 9613(b). Joslyn brought this action claiming that James Co. was liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2) as an "owner or operator." Joslyn also advanced claims under the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act ("LEQA"). La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 30:2001 (West Supp.1989). The defendants included James Co., Railway, and Powerline. Powerline filed third-party complaints against, *inter alia*, Lance Alworth; Alworth then filed a cross-claim against James Co.

The district court granted James Co.'s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Congress, in enacting CERCLA, did not intend an exception to the general rule in corporation law of limited liability. 696 F.Supp. 222.

Discussion

CERCLA provides in relevant part:

Section 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2), makes liable:

> (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or opperated [sic] any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of. . . .

"Owner or operator" is defined in the statute as:

> (20)(A)(ii) in the case of an onshore facility . . . any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the . . . facility.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(20).

Joslyn urges this court to read CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator" liberally and broadly to reach parent corporations whose subsidiaries are found liable under the statute. In doing so, Joslyn urges us to follow the several courts, including the Second Circuit, which have extended CERCLA liability to parents. *See New York v. Shore Realty Corp.*, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1985); *United States v. Mottolo*, 695 F.Supp. 615 (D.N.H.1988); *Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.*, 18 Envtl.L.Rep. (Envtl.L.Inst.) 20578 (D.Col.1987); *Vermont v. Staco, Inc.*, 684 F.Supp. 822

(D.Vt.1988); *Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.*, 635 F.Supp. 665 (D.Idaho 1986). We decline to do so.

Significantly, CERCLA does not define "owners" or "operators" as including the parent company of offending wholly-owned subsidiaries. Nor does the legislative history indicate that Congress intended to alter so substantially a basic tenet of corporation law. "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if it is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." *Caminetti v. United States*, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917). Joslyn asks this court to rewrite the language of the Act significantly and hold parents directly liable for their subsidiaries' activities. To do so would dramatically alter traditional concepts of corporation law. The "normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific." *Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey*, 474 U.S. 494, 501, 106 S.Ct. 755, 759, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986). Any bold rewriting of corporation law in this area is best left to Congress.

Appellants have pointed this court to little in the legislative history of CERCLA to indicate that Congress intended to make such a significant change in corporation law principles. Powerline points to an "inherent" underlying intent of congress to hold those who profited from hazardous waste sites responsible for the cost of cleanup and a desire to effectuate a timely cleanup of these sites. As the Court noted in *Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*, 443 U.S. 256, 267, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2759, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979), *reh. denied*, 444 U.S. 889, 100 S.Ct. 194,

62 L.Ed.2d 126 (reviewing Court of Appeals' decision modifying longshoreman's preexisting rights), "[S]ilence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely." Without an express Congressional directive to the contrary, common-law principles of corporation law, such as limited liability, govern our court's analysis. *See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201*, 843 F.2d 1427-1430 (D.C.Cir.1988).

If Congress wanted to extend liability to parent corporations it could have done so, and it remains free to do so. The Seventh Circuit recently declined to expand the "owner or operator" definition, although it recognized the policy benefits inherent in a broad reading of the Act's scope. *Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.*, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.1988) ("To the point that courts could achieve 'more' of the legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes have not only ends but also limits.").

As the district court observed, Congress is quite capable of creating statutes that hold shareholders or controlling entities liable for the acts of valid corporations. In fact, Congress adopted a "control" test in the next subsection of the statute. Under CERCLA, the term "owner or operator" is defined for facilities conveyed to state or local governments by bankruptcy, tax delinquency or abandonment, as "any person who owned, operated *or otherwise controlled* activities at such facility immediately" before conveyance. 42 U.S.C. Section 9601(20)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). No such "control" test appears in subsection (ii), the subsection at issue in this

case, and we will imply none. Similarly, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 30:2276 (West 1989 Supp.) does not impose direct liability on parent corporations for the acts of their subsidiaries.

Further, the facts here militate against piercing the corporate veil. Lincoln faithfully adhered to basic corporate formalities by keeping its own books and records and holding frequent shareholder and directors meetings. the daily operations of Lincoln and James Co. were separate. Hayes and Tooke were the most involved in the operations of Lincoln; neither was employed by James Co. Lincoln owned its own property, and the property was not used by James Co. Lincoln filed separate tax returns. Lincoln paid its own bills and made its own arrangement for employee benefits. The notes from the 1950 special shareholders meeting indicate that Lincoln operated quite independently from James Co.

The district court was correctly guided by our court's prior decision in *United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.*, 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1194, 89 L.Ed.2d 309 (1986). There, our Circuit set out criteria for analyzing the issue of "control" in the parent/subsidiary context. In this case, the district court ran through the "laundry list" and properly found that the facts did not justify piercing the corporate veil. Veil piercing should be limited to situations in which the corporate entity is used as a *sham* to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal liability. *See Jon-T, supra* at 691 (quoting *Krivo v. Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp.*, 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir.1973)) ("control required for liability under the 'instrumentality' rule amounts to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent

that the subservient corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation"). The facts in this case do not support a finding that Lincoln was designed as a bogus shell for James Co. to hide behind.

The district court allowed extensive discovery in this case. Appellants have pointed to those matters that they believe constitute a material issue of fact for determining whether James Co. can be held indirectly liable for Lincoln's activities. Those facts, if true, do not justify piercing the corporate veil. Therefore, the district court's grant of James Co.'s summary judgment motion was proper. We AFFIRM.[1]

---

[1] Because it was not ruled on below we do not here pass on Powerline's "corporate distributee theory of liability – Powerline asserts that James Co. was Lincoln's corporate distributee and that, as such, James Co. may be responsible.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 88-4901

JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

T.L. JAMES & CO., INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,

v.

POWERLINE SUPPLY CO., INC.,
Defendant Third Party
Plaintiff-Appellant.

and

Nelda S. ELLIOT, Bill Elliot, and Lance D. Alworth, Louisiana and Arkansas Railroad Co., Defendants-Appellants,

v.

Floyd Benjamin JAMES and George William James, Sr., Third Party
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

---

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Filed March 26, 1990)

Before GEE and JONES, Circuit Judges, and HUNTER, District Judge:*

---

* District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed in the above entitled and numbered cause be and the same is hereby DENIED.

CLERK'S NOTE:
SEE FRAP AND LOCAL
RULES 41 FOR STAY OF THE
MANDATE.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Thomas Gibbs Gee
United States Circuit Judge

REHG-4

JOSLYN CORPORATION

v.

T.L. JAMES & COMPANY, INC. et al.

Civ. A. No. 87-2054.

United States District Court,
W.D. Louisiana,

Shreveport Division.

Sept. 19, 1988.

Corporation ordered to clean up contaminated site of former wood treating and/or creosoting operation initiated action under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and Louisiana Environmental Quality Act. In memorandum ruling on various motions, the District Court, Stagg, Chief Judge, held that: (1) individual liability could not be imposed on corporate officers under CERCLA for hazardous waste cleanup, nor could parent corporation be held directly liable without first piercing the corporate veil, and (2) that veil would not be pierced, absent proof that parent had complete domination of finances, policies, and practices of subsidiary.

Summary judgment for defendant.

Robert E. Holden, J. Berry St. John Jr., William Craig Wyman, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, La., James W. Hailey Jr., Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, Metaire, La., Liskow & Lewis, Lafayette, La., for plaintiffs.

Robert G. Dawkins, Dawkins, Coyle & Carter, Stephen J. Weiss and Donald B. Mitchell, Arent, Fox, Kintner,

Plotkin and Kahn, Washington, D.C., for T.L. James & Co. Inc.

Bobby S. Gilliam, Wilkinson, Carmody & Gilliam, Shreveport, La., for La. & Ark. Ry. Co.

James B. Gardner, Lunn, Irion Johnson, Salley & Carlisle, Shreveport, La., for Commercial Union Ins. Co.

Philip C. Stahl, Katherine E. Rakowsky, Grippo & Elden, Chicago, Ill., Redoux R. Provosty Jr., F. Rae Swent, Provosty, Sadler & deLaunay, Alexandria, La., for Nat. Sur. Corp.

J. Fleet Howell, Wiener, Weiss, Madison & Howell, Shreveport, La., for Koppers Co., Inc.

David F. Butterfield, Mayer, Smith & Roberts, Shreveport, La., for Powerline Supply Co.

Kevin M. Ward, Michael C. Donovan, Charles Kevin Cahill, Denver, Colo., James L. Adams, Kennedy, Goodman & Donovan, Shreveport, La., for Lance D. Allworth: (defendant & third party).

James L. Nelson, Shreveport, La., for Graham W. Rogers and John Walker Price: (third parties).

Gary M. Zwain, Duplass, Witman & Zwain, Metairie, La., for Wesley D. Burdine: (third party).

Jerald Harper, Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, Shreveport, La., for David Myatt: (third party).

MEMORANDUM RULING

STAGG, Chief Judge.

Joslyn Corporation (hereinafter "Joslyn") initiated this action against, *inter alia*, T.L. James & Company, Inc. (hereinafter "T.L. James" or "James Company"), asserting an action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (hereinafter "CERCLA")[1] and the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act (hereinafter "LEQA")[2]. The suit was instituted by Joslyn after the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality had issued several orders to certain parties, including Joslyn, requiring the investigation and cleanup of a contaminated site in Bossier Parish, Louisiana that was formerly a wood-treating and/or creosoting operation. The claims, cross claims, counterclaims and third party demands involved in this action are too numerous to list.

Presently under advisement are the following:

1. T.L. James's motion and renewed motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment;

2. T.L. James's motion and renewed motion to dismiss the cross claim of Powerline Supply Company;

3. T.L. James's motion to dismiss the cross claim of the Louisiana and Arkansas Railway Company for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment;

---

[1] 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) and (Supp. V 1987), *as amended by* Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.L., No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).

[2] La.Rev.Stat. 30:1051 *et seq.*

4. T.L. James's motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Lance D. Alworth; and

5. T.L. James's motion to dismiss the amended cross claim of Lance D. Alworth.

Though these motions present several issues, they all request the court to determine whether CERCLA imposes direct liability upon a parent corporation or requires a claimant to pierce the corporate veil before liability may attach. A recitation of material facts will be deferred until the court completes its analysis of this legal issue.

DIRECT OR DERIVATIVE LIABILITY?

Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), provides, in relevant part:

> Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this Section –
>
> * * * * * *
>
> (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of [shall be liable under this Section].

Under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A), the term "owner or operator" means "in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility." "Person" includes an "individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership . . . commercial entity. . . . " *Id.* at § 9601.

Joslyn[3] argues that T.L. James must be deemed an "owner or operator" under CERCLA § 107(a) and is, therefore, directly liable. CERCLA does not specifically address the question of whether a court may hold a parent corporation or corporate officers liable for clean-up costs without first piercing the corporate veil. Several courts addressing the issue have held that corporate officers may be individually liable for hazardous waste clean-up under CERCLA.[4] The undersigned respectfully declines to adopt the analysis utilized by these courts because they have chosen to ignore the corporate form without an express congressional directive.

In *Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 453 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit made clear the importance of the corporate structure:

---

[3] For the sake of brevity, reference will only be made to Joslyn's position which has been adopted by all the nonmoving parties against whom motions are presently under consideration.

[4] *State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp.*, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1985); *United States v. Ward*, 618 F.Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C.1985); *United States v. Conservation Chemical Company*, 619 F.Supp. 162 (W.D.Mo.1985); *United States v. Mottolo*, 605 F.Supp. 898 (D.N.H.1985); *United States v. Carolawn Company*, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C.1984); *United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company (NEPPACCO)*, 579 F.Supp. 823 (W.D.Mo.1984), *affirmed in part, reversed in part*, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); *United States v. Wade*, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.Pa 1983). Also, in *Idaho v. The Bunker Hill Company*, 635 F.Supp. 665 (D.Id.1986), liability was imposed, without piercing the corporate veil, under CERCLA on a parent corporation held to the "owner or operator" of a disposal facility.

> It is elemental jurisprudence that a corporation is a creature of the law, endowed with a personality separate and distinct from that of its owners, and that one of the principal purposes for legal sanctioning of a separate corporate personality is to accord stockholders an opportunity to limit their personal liability.

See also, Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., 658 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir.1981) ("[t]he principle of limited liability remains a dominant characteristic of American corporate law."), *cert. denied*, 456 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 2256, 72 L.Ed.2d 861 (1982); and *Krivo Industrial Supply Company v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp.*, 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir.1973) ("the corporate form . . . is not lightly disregarded since limited liability is one of the principal purposes for which the law has created the corporation."). In *Cort v. Ash*, 422 U.S. 66, 84, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2090, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court refused to create a federal private right to action for allegedly illegal corporate campaign contributions, holding that:

> Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.

In *Homan & Crimen, Inc. v. Harris*, 626 F.2d 1201, 1205 (5th Cir.1980), *cert. denied*, 450 U.S. 975, 101 S.Ct. 1506, 67 L.Ed.2d 809 (1981), Medenco, Inc. owned 100 per cent of the stock of Homan & Crimen, Inc. an unrelated corporation doing business as Southwestern General Hospital. The hospital submitted its Medicare cost reports for two years, claiming $830,000 as a step up in the cost basis of

its assets. *Id.*[5] There were costs incurred by Medenco, Inc. In claiming entitlement to this amount, plaintiffs argued under 42 C.F.R. § 405.427 that "costs applicable to services, facilities, and supplies furnished to the provider by organizations related to the provider by common *ownership or control* are includable in the allowable cost to the provider at the cost to the related organization." *Id.* at 1208 (emphasis added).

Based upon this regulation, Homan & Crimen contended that "form should not be exalted over substance and the fiction of the separateness of the corporation and its shareholders should not be used to reach an unfair and unjust result." *Id.* The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument:

> To this contention, the response must be that if the separateness of the corporation and its shareholders is a fiction, it is one which the law has long recognized and will not lightly go behind. [Citations omitted.] *For the regulation to cut through or ignore that mass of established corporate law upon which the Secretary relied would require at the very least a clear intention, a compelling case. It cannot be done by implication as plaintiffs suggest here.*

Id. (emphasis added.) Stated differently, "[w]hether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress." *Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.*, 384 U.S. 63, 68, 86 S.Ct. 1301, 1304, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966). "Even where there is related federal legislation in an area, as is true in this instance, it must be

---

[5] *See,* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395X and 1395F.

remembered that 'Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states. . . . " *Id. quoting from Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System* at p. 435 (1953).[6]

Based upon the foregoing authorities, this court holds that the corporate form, including limited liability for shareholders, is a doctrine firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that may not be disregarded absent a specific congressional directive. Neither the clear language of CERCLA nor its legislative history provides authority for imposing individual liability on corporate officers or direct liability on parent corporations.[7] Though it is recognized that CERCLA was enacted in the "waning hours of the 96th Congress," and was "the product of apparent legislative compromise [that] is not a model of clarity," *Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,*

---

[6] *See also, Burks v. Lasker,* 441 U.S. 471, 478-79, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 1837-38, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979) (holding that in actions asserting violations under the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act, federal courts must apply state corporate law governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue shareholders' derivative actions because corporate law is not an area in which these statutes authorize federal courts to "fashion a complete body of federal law"); *Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,* 407 U.S. 385, 413-14, 92 S.Ct. 2247-2263, 33 L.Ed.2d 11 (1972) (refusing to pierce veil of union political fund despite evidence of control and domination, in view of compliance with formal statutory requirements).

[7] Comment, *Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What Are the Consequences?,* 38 Mercer L.Rev. 677, 679 (1987).

Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir.1988), this court will not read into the statute a provision disregarding decades of corporate law. The court's conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Congress has, in the past, specified that shareholders or controlling parties are to be held responsible for the acts or debts of a valid corporation. *See, e.g.*, Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207; I.R.C. § 1239(b)(2), (3) (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(r), 29 U.S. § 203(r); and ERISA § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1); *see also*, 16 C.F.R. § 15.482 (1981). Absent a similar provision in CERCLA, this court finds no direct liability against James Company.

THE RULE OF DECISION

It is undisputed that federal law governs in actions arising under nationwide federal programs. *United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.*, 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979). The question is whether state law should be adopted as the rule of decision or whether federal common law should control. As the Supreme Court has noted:

> That the statutes authorizing these federal lending programs do not specify the appropriate rule of decision in no way limits the reach of federal law. It is precisely when Congress has not spoken "in an area comprising issues substantially related to an established program of government operation, [citation omitted,] that *Clearfield [Trust Company v. United States*, 318 U.S. 363, 367, 63 S.Ct. 573, 575, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943)] directs federal courts to fill the interstices of federal legislation according to their own standards."

440 U.S. at 727, 99 S.Ct. at 1458, *quoting from Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence and Discretion and the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,* 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 797, 800 (1957). The normal course of analysis would require this court to apply the test set forth in *United State v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra,* as explained by *Georgia Power Company v. Sanders,* 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc), *cert. denied,* 450 U.S. 936, 101 S.Ct. 1403, 67 L.Ed.2d 372 (1981). This inquiry, however, is unnecessary because the Fifth Circuit has held:

> [W]e find no need to determine whether a uniform federal alter ego rule is required, since the federal and state alter ego tests are essentially the same. Our non-diversity alter ego cases have rarely stated whether they were applying a federal or state standard, and have cited federal and state cases interchangably.

United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. 768 F.2d 685, 690 n.6 (5th Cir.1985), *cert. denied,* 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1194, 89 L.Ed.2d 309 (1986) (citations omitted)[8].

The Fifth Circuit in *Jon-T Chemicals* then proceeded to set forth general standards of piercing the corporate veil that have evolved in this circuit. In *Krivo Industrial Supply Company v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.,* 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir.1973), the Fifth Circuit noted: "[o]ne of

---

[8] For a view that state alter ego, as opposed to federal common law, will conflict with the purposes of CERCLA, *see,* Note, *Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages,* 99 Harv.L.Rev. 986 (1986). Though the Court in *Jon-T* was faced with Texas law, the undersigned is satisfied that the principles utilized in this opinion would control whether Louisiana or federal common law governs. *See, infra,* at 232-33.

the most difficult applications of the rule permitting the corporate form to be disregarded arises when one corporation is sought to be held liable for the debts of another corporation." Unless the parent corporation expressly or impliedly assumes responsibility for the debts of the subsidiary. Liability will attach only when the parent "misuses that corporation by treating it, and by using it, as a mere business conduit for the purposes of the dominant corporation." *Id.* Two elements are held to be essential:

> First, the dominant corporation must have controlled the subservient corporation, and second, the dominant corporation must have proximately caused plaintiff harm through misuse of this control.

Id. at 1103, *citing, inter alia, Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 848, 93 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed.2d 89 (1972). The Court further held:

> The control required for liability . . . amounts to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation.

Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1106. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit adopted the recommendation of Professor Fletcher:

> The control necessary to invoke what is sometimes called the 'instrumentality rule' is not more majority or complete stock control but such domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business conduit for its principal.

Id. quoting from 1 W. Fletcher, *Cyclopedia of the La of Private Corporations* § 43 (Perm. ed. rev. 1963). *See also, John-T Chemicals,* 768 F.2d at 691; and *Baker v. Raymond International, Inc.,* 656 F.23d (sic) 173, 180 (5th Cir.1981). In determining whether a parent corporation has exercised the requisite degree of control over a subsidiary to pierce the corporate veil, the Fifth Circuit has developed a laundry list of factors. These included whether:

(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership;

(2) the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers;

(3) the parent and the subsidiary have common business departments;

(4) the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax returns;

(5) the parent finances the subsidiary;

(6) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary;

(7) the subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate capital;

(8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary;

(9) the subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent;

(10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property as its own;

(11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept separate; and

(12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporation formalities, such as keeping

> separate books and records and holding shareholders and board meetings.

Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 691-92 (citations omitted). Resolution of the alter ego issues is "heavily fact-specific" and requires an evaluation of the totality of the aforementioned factors. *Id.* at 694.

THE FACTS

This dispute is over the materiality of facts, not their existence. Lincoln Creosoting Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Lincoln") was incorporated in the State of Louisiana on December 4, 1935. The idea to form Lincoln came from Messrs. Tooke and Hayes, who approached Mr. T.L. James. Mr. James paid $20,110 for 120 shares of voting common stock of Lincoln and 200 shares of non-voting preferred stock. C.A. Tooke and J.R. Hayes received 40 shares each of the voting common stock of Lincoln for a total of 40 per cent of the Lincoln stock. All outstanding stock certificates, however, were accompanied by endorsements back to James Company. The endorsements of Tooke and Hayes were to the effect that they have endorsed the stock to T.L. James "where it shall remain until such time as their earnings from dividends on the stock shall have repaid the par value of the stock."[9] Since

---

[9] This is evidenced by a letter from J.C. Love Jr. of T.L. James to the vice president of the National Surety Corporation dated May 25, 1948. The letter goes on to state: "While actually T.L. James & Company only owns 60 per cent of the capital stock, they do, as of this time, control the full 100 per cent and will continue to do so until such time as dividends may have repaid all the original value of 40 per cent owned by the operators." Joslyn Exhibit 8.

Lincoln never paid any common stock dividends, James Company had control over 100 per cent of Lincoln's stock.

Lincoln's first board of directors consisted of seven members: Mr. T.L. James, Mrs. T.L. James Jr., Mr. G.W. James, Mr. Floyd B. James, Mr. C.A. Tooke, Mr. J.R. Hayes and Mr. V.A. Davidson. Excluding Messrs. Tooke and Hayes, all were officers, directors and/or shareholders of T.L. James & Company. At the first meeting of the Lincoln Board of Directors, Mr. Tooke, who was vice president of Lincoln, was designated as general manager with full power and discretion to conduct the corporation's affairs.

The property at issue in this suit was purchased in Lincoln's name on December 17, 1935. At least since 1936, Lincoln had its own bank account at the Commercial National Bank in Shreveport. Checks were signed jointly by Messrs. Tooke and Hayes. From its inception. Lincoln frequently and periodically held separate meetings of the directors and shareholders. At the annual shareholders meetings, Mr. Tooke was responsible for making the report of the preceding year and outlining policy for the coming year.

Mr. T.L. James died in July of 1944. On September 11, 1944, the Lincoln directors met and chose Mr. G. William James as the successor-president of Lincoln. Mr. G. William James served as president of Lincoln from 1944 through 1950.

In 1943 and 1944, Lincoln lost money. In the summer or fall of 1944, Mr. G.W. James approached J.E. Lacy concerning employment with Lincoln. James offered Lacy $1,000 a month for three months to "go over there [to

Lincoln] and see what was the matter with this plant, why it wasn't making any money."[10] Lacy accepted the job and worked for three weeks. Lacy surmised that the problem at Lincoln was an internal fight between Messrs. Tooke and Hayes. According to Lacy, "Hayes' ambition was to get out and get a plant of his own. So he was not doing the things he should be doing, and that left Tooke with the inability to make the plant operate properly."[11]

Subsequent thereto, Lacy was employed by Lincoln. This came about after G.W. James bought out Hayes' interest. Lacy was placed in charge of production. Lacy, however, was only on Lincoln's payroll and not that of T.L. James & Company. At a shareholders meeting on March 13, 1945, a resolution was passed thanking Hayes for his service to Lincoln and noting that Hayes was "the originator of the ideas which developed Lincoln."[12] At the same meeting. G.W. James was reelected president and Tooke was reelected vice president. V.A. Davidson was elected secretary replacing Mr. Hayes.

At a directors meeting on October 8, 1945, a new resolution was passed pursuant to which Messrs. Tooke, Lacy and Plummer were authorized to sign checks on behalf of Lincoln.

At a special shareholders meeting on March 3, 1947, the number of directors was increased to eight. Four of these were Lincoln employees and four were affiliated

---

[10] Deposition of Lacy at 15, Joslyn Exhibit 15.

[11] *Id.* at 16.

[12] *See* Attachment "C" to T.L. James' Statement of Undisputed Facts as 67.

with James Company. The four Lincoln employees were Tooke, Freeman, Lacy and Plummer.

A special board meeting was held on December 29, 1947, at which time it was agreed that due to rather substantial obligations of Lincoln, it would not be advisable to consider any common stock dividends on account of the 1947 earnings. Upon the motion of J.C. Love, however, it was agreed that $20,000 be presented to Centenary College toward the T.L. James Memorial Fund.

At the regular annual meeting of stockholders on March 9, 1948, Tooke reported that the "future of the treating business is rather a vague picture."[13] The vagueness was due to the declining demand for creosoted products as the result of consumers' inability to secure wire and transformers. In addition, the creation of new creosoting plants was noted to have caused the supply of creosoted items to be unreasonably large. Despite this, Tooke stated his belief that the 1948 operations would be profitable. G.W. James commented at this meeting that he felt "the management of the creosoting business was to be commended for assuming such a logical attitude with reference to the forthcoming problems."[14]

At a special directors meeting held on December 16, 1949, a resolution was passed granting authority to any two among C.A. Tooke (vice president), H.R. Freeman (director) and W.W. Colbert (purchasing agent), to make

---

[13] *Id.* at 84.

[14] *Id.* at 85.

withdrawals from Lincoln's corporate account at Commercial National Bank in Shreveport. This resolution was approved by G.W. James and Mr. Davidson.

Mr. Tooke died on May 4, 1950. As a result, a special meeting of Lincoln's Board of Directors was held on May 15, 1950. G.W. James stated that he "felt very keenly the loss of not only the sincere friendship, but the keen business judgment of C.A. Tooke."[15] Mr. James further stated that the purpose of the meeting was to try to decide what course should be followed without the leadership of Mr. Tooke. James stated that: "As everyone knew, Lincoln Creosoting Company had originally been organized through the efforts of Mr. Tooke and that it had been the attitude of those in Ruston that it was Mr. Tooke's enterprise and had been since it was first organized." Without the leadership of Mr. Tooke, it was G.W. James' opinion and the opinion of those in Ruston that the business should be sold. It was agreed at the meeting that every effort should immediately be made to sell Lincoln. In the event that a purchaser could not be secured, it was agreed that plans would be made for an orderly liquidation. Since Mr. Lacy was most familiar with the general management of the business, it was agreed that he would assume the position formerly held by Mr. Tooke. It was then approved that Lacy's name would be added to the list of names of any two required signatures to withdraw funds from Lincoln's account. Floyd B. James stated that, "it was his opinion and that of the members he had spoken with that the corporation was indebted to Mr. Tooke for the development of the

---

[15] *Id.* at 98.

corporation from its infancy to its present status and that in view of these facts he moved that the corporation pay to Mrs. Tooke, the widow of C.A. Tooke, his salary for a period of twelve months. . . . "[16]

A special meeting of stockholders was held on July 20, 1950 for the purpose of considering the sale of Lincoln's principal assets. Mr. Lacy outlined a proposition to purchase Lincoln that had been made by Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Company. After a general discussion of the proposal, a resolution was introduced by Mr. Plummer which authorized G.W. James to execute a memorandum agreement with Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Company for the sale of Lincoln's physical plant and real estate, the entire black stock inventory, the entire white stock inventory, the entire stock of creosote oil and the entire account of usable transient freight. This resolution was unanimously adopted by the Board of Directors on July 20, 1950.

The shareholders voted on December 27, 1950 to repurchase as treasury stock 41 shares of common stock held by Messrs. Lacy, Freeman and Plummer, and the Tooke heirs. The shareholders also agreed that all 200 shares of preferred stock held by James Company, which were the original capitalization of Lincoln, should be redeemed at par value of $100 a share plus accrued dividends to the next dividend date.

At the March 20, 1951 annual meeting of the Board of Directors, Lacy advised that the transfer of Lincoln's properties to Joslyn Manufacturing Company was nearly

---

[16] *Id.* at 99.

complete and that all miscellaneous items of charge and credit had been settled. The only matter remaining to consummate the sale was the payment of the monthly amount, as provided for in the memorandum agreement. Mr. Lacy then summarized outstanding business matters to be resolved and stated that, in his estimation, the entire affairs of the creosoting company should be completed well in advance of the close of the 1951 calendar year. The same eight directors who had served since 1947 were reelected, with the exception of C.A. Tooke Jr., who was elected to replace the late C.A. Tooke.

On November 26, 1951, the shareholders of T.L. James & Company, Inc. held a special meeting "to consider the desirability . . . of mak[ing] a contribution or donation from T.L. James & Company, Inc. to Centenary College of Louisiana . . . consisting of all shares of stock of Lincoln Creosoting Company, Inc. presently owned" by James Company.[17] A resolution was unanimously passed authorizing this donation. The James Company board of Directors approved this resolution on December 10, 1951.

On December 19, 1952, a Certificate of Dissolution was signed dissolving Lincoln. According to the Certificate, "all debts, obligations and liabilities of this corporation have been paid and discharged," that "there are no suits pending against this corporation in any Court," and that the assets have been distributed to the shareholders

---

[17] *See*, Attachment "D" at 195 to T.L. James' Statement of Undisputed Facts.

"in accordance with their respective rights and interests."[18]

ANALYSIS OF LAW AND FACTS

Joslyn urges that six of the twelve factors cited in *Jon-T Chemicals, supra,* support the conclusion that the corporate veil should be pierced. Specifically, Joslyn points out that the parent and subsidiary have common stock ownership as well as common directors. It is further urged by Joslyn that the positions held by G.W. James and Mr. Davidson constituted direct control over Lincoln's finances.[19] These facts are undoubtedly true and material:

> Nevertheless, our cases are clear that 100 per cent ownership and identity of directors and

---

[18] Attachment "A" to T.L. James' Statement of Undisputed Facts.

[19] In support of this contention, Joslyn refers to two letters from G.W. James and V.A. Davidson to their accountant. The letters were written in regard to an IRS audit concerning these individuals' salaries from Lincoln. Contained in the letters are statements that these directors were consistently involved in the financial affairs of Lincoln, and that Mr. Davidson served as a contact between plant personnel and G.W. James. Though these letters evidence minimal control in financial affairs, they bear no weight in determining control over the nuts and bolts of Lincoln's operations and the day-to-day affairs. It must be remembered that the corporate veil will not be pierced unless the parent's control "amounts to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient corporation manifests no separate corporate interest of its own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the dominant corporation. *Krivo,* 483 F.2d at 1106. "Merely taking an active part in the management of the debtor corporation does not automatically constitute control. . . . " *Id.* at 1105.

> officers are, even together, an insufficient basis for applying the alter ego theory to pierce the corporate veil. [*Citing Nelson v. International Paint Company*, 734 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1984) and *Miles v. AT & T*, 703 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1983).] Instead, we maintain the fiction that an officer or director of both corporations can change hats and represent the two corporations separately, despite their common ownership.

Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 691; *see also, Baker*, 656 F.2d at 180 ("Ownership of a controlling interest in a corporation entitles the controlling shareholder to exercise the normal incidence of stock ownership . . . without forfeiting the protection of limited liability."); and *Berger*, 453 F.2d at 994 (same).

Joslyn also points out that James Company made substantial loans to Lincoln, including the initial capitalization. The uncontroverted record establishes, however, that these loans were repaid. In any event, "the general rule is that the mere loan of money by one corporation to another does not automatically make the lender liable for the acts and omissions of the borrower." *Krivo*, 483 F.2d at 1104, *citing Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Company*, 205 U.S. 364, 27 S.Ct. 513, 51 L.Ed. 841 (1907). Joslyn also asserts that the James Company hired and fired Lincoln's executive officers. This allegation is based upon the hiring of Lacy and the resignation of Hayes. Though this is minimally indicative of control, it can hardly be said to rise to the level justifying disregard of the corporate form. Indeed, "to justify a judicial derogation of the separateness of a corporate creature, an aggrieved party must prove something more than . . . the parent's use of its power as an incident of its stock

ownership to elect officers and directors of the subsidiary." *Berger*, 453 F.2d at 994.

Joslyn also takes issue with the fact that T.L. James Sr., G.W. James and V.A. Davidson worked out of James Company's corporate offices. Lincoln neither had a lease nor paid rent for the use of these offices. Once again, this is only marginally relevant. These individuals were officers of both corporations. Clearly, they had to work somewhere. That they chose to work out of James Company's corporate offices simply is not sufficient to disregard the separate corporate structures.

The lengthy factual account set forth above establishes beyond doubt that Lincoln strictly adhered to basic corporate formalities by keeping its own books and records and frequently and periodically holding shareholder and director meetings. The daily operations of Lincoln and James Company were kept separate. The driving forces behind Lincoln were Messrs. Hayes and Tooke, neither of whom was employed by James Company. Lincoln owned its own property where the physical plant was situated. This property was not utilized for the business of James Company. None of Lincoln's employees were on the payroll of James Company. Though James Company provided capital for Lincoln's initial incorporation, it was the effort and initiative of Messrs. Tooke and Hayes that resulted in the formulation of Lincoln. Lincoln filed separate income tax returns.

In addition to these compelling facts, it should also be noted that Lincoln paid its own bills and made arrangements for employee benefits such as sick pay, retirement and profit sharing. Lincoln Creosoting's

invoices directed that payment be made to Lincoln and not to James Company.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses in the spirit of the rule requiring a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); *Meyers v. M/V Eugenio C*, 842 F.2d 815, 816-17 (5th Cir.1988). Indeed, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole. . . ." *Celotex*, 106 S.Ct. at 2555, *citing* Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 and Schwarzer, *Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact*, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex*, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. A defendant moving for summary judgment may rest on the absence of evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiff's case. *Celotex*, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; *International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, ALF-CIO, Lodge No. 2504 v. Intercontinental Manufacturing Company, Inc.*, 812 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1987) Once this burden has been established, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. *Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio*

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In fact, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to come forth with "significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." *Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corp.*, 742 F.2d 862, 877 (5th Cir.1984).

The summary judgment standard has been said to mirror that of Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for involuntary dismissal in nonjury cases. *Professional Managers v. Fawer, Brian Hardy & Zatzkis*, 799 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir.1986). In this respect, Judge Rubin has noted:

> If the decision is to be reached by the court, and there are no issues of witness credibility, the court may conclude on the basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulations before it, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, even though decision may depend on inferences to be drawn from what has been in controvertibly proved . . . even if that conclusion is deemed 'factual' or involves a 'mixed question of law and fact.' A trial on the merits would reveal no additional data. Hearing and viewing the witnesses subject to cross-examination would not aid the determination if there are neither issues of credibility nor controversies with respect to the substance of the proposed testimony. The judge, as trier of fact, is in a position to and ought to draw his inferences without resort to the expenses of trial.

Nunez v. Superior Oil Company, 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (5th Cir.1978).

The court is satisfied that James Company fulfilled its intitial burden by first proving that liability will attach only if the corporate veil is pierced and then by establishing, through competent proof, facts showing that under the governing substantive law the corporate form should not be disregarded. Joslyn's rebutting facts and arguments, even considered in their totality, simply do not constitute significant probative evidence demonstrating a triable issue of fact. This is especially true in this nonjury case where substantial discovery has been conducted. This court was particularly liberal in affording the parties ample opportunity to brief the legal issues and provide supporting documentation. Joslyn has not made the court aware of any uncompleted discovery which would be relevant toward the issue of derivative liability. Stated differently, Joslyn has not come forward with proof demonstrating a triable issue of fact as to whether the James Company exercised total domination over Lincoln to the extent that Lincoln manifested no separate corporate interest of its own and functioned solely to achieve the purposes of James Company. *Jon-T Chemicals*, 768 F.2d at 691; *Krivo*, 483 F.2d at 1106. There is simply no proof that James Company had complete domination of finances, policies and practices to cause Lincoln to be not a separate business entity but a mere conduit of James Company. *Id.*

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of T.L. James & Company, and that all claims against it be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.[20] Assuming, without deciding, that

---

[20] Though this court declined to follow the analysis utilized by the cases cited in footnote 4, *supra*, it is noteworthy

(Continued on following page)

the LEQA is constitutional and Joslyn has satisfied prerequisites to filing an action, the foregoing analysis establishes that Joslyn cannot pierce the corporate veil under Louisiana law, which utilizes a similar if not more stringent rule than that applied in this opinion. *See, generally, GRW Engineers, Inc. v. Elam*, 504 So.2d 117, 120 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), *writ denied*, 506 So.2d 1230 (La.1987); *Harris v. Best of America, Inc.*, 466 So.2d 1309, 1315 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), *writ denied*, 470 So.2d 121 (La.1985); *Kingsman Enterprises, Inc. v. Bakersfield Electric Company, Inc.*, 339 So.2d 1280, 1282 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976); *Menard v. Associated Royal Crown Bottling Company*, 249 So.2d 363, 364-65 (La.App. 4th Cir.1971). Accordingly, summary judgment must be GRANTED in favor of T.L. James & Company with respect to claims against it under LEQA.

(Continued from previous page)

that this court would have likely reached the same result under applicable corporate law at least in *Conservation Chemical, Mottolo* and *Shore Realty*. These cases involved factual situations where the personal participation in the illegal disposal of hazardous waste by the corporate officers was significant. As one commentator has noted, these "courts have avoided the common law rule of limited liability by either explicitly or implicitly applying a generally recognized exception; a corporate officer is liable for the wrongful acts of a corporation when he personally participates in the wrongful conduct." Comment, 38 Mercer L.Rev. at 685. If T.L., James & Company and its officers and directors had been actively involved in the day-to-day operations of Lincoln, including the disposal of hazardous waste, then, arguably, liability would attach. *See, generally, Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp.*, 621 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.1980); *L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.*, 619 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.1980); *Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven recreation Associations, Inc.*, 517 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.1975).

An order consistent with the terms of this memorandum ruling shall issue herewith.

---

§ 9607. Liability

(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; "comparable maturity" date

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section –

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and

(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or site selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for –

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and

(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.

The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such interest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid balance of the amounts recoverable under this section shall be the same rate as is specified for interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments to interest under this subsection, the term 'comparable maturity" shall be determined with reference to the date on which interest accruing under this subsection commences.

42 § 9601

(20)(A) The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to

bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.

(B) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been accepted for transportation by a common or contract carrier and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of this title, (i) the term "owner or operator" shall mean such common carrier or other bona fide for hire carrier acting as an independent contractor during such transportation, (ii) the shipper of such hazardous substance shall not be considered to have caused or contributed to any release during such transportation which resulted solely from circumstances or conditions beyond his control.

(C) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been delivered by a common or contract carrier to a disposal or treatment facility and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of this title (i) the term "owner or operator" shall not include such common or contract carrier, and (ii) such common or contract carrier shall not be considered to have caused or contributed to any release at such disposal or treatment facility resulting from circumstances or conditions beyond its control.

(D) The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax

delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign.

The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.